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This effect has become evident in the context of 'longitudinal' 
thnographic studies, which involve observation of the subject society 
:ver a oeriod of several decades . It has been oossible to isolate 
orocesses ooerating over the 'long term' that are not evident within the 
shorter oeriods studied by traditional ethnology. Since such distinc-
tions can be discriminated within periods of time that are relatively 
short in comoarison to those often involved in archaeological analysis, 
it is essential to consider the effect of time perspective. This should 
not imply a dichotomy of methods or issues relating to short- vs. long-
term categories, but a continuous spectrum: explanatory principles mu~t 
be emoloyed that can be expected to operate over the period that 1s 
under consideration. Hence, the problem for the archaeologist becomes 
one of identifying variables and models appropriate to the time 
framework being studied. The papers assembled here deal with a number 
of time frameworks and show the variety of issues to be considered. 
Within the context of a specific society, the way in which time is 
oerceived is oroblem11tic: time may be measured according to social 
necessity rather than regulating and defining that necessity. Shanks 
11nd Tillev argue for the imoortance of perceived time intervals as 
oooosed to the abstract chronology generally used in archaeology. They 
criticise the projection of modern systems of time measurement onto 
other cultures as a ternpor11l imoerialism justifying the status~· 
Sinclair and de Montmollin also discuss this aspect, observing that 
different concepts of time can be held by different classes within the 
same society. The argument is illustrated in two quite distinct histo-
rically known societies -- prehispanic Mesoamerica and 17th-18th century 
England. In both, time reckoning and scheduling of activities is. seen 
to vary according to social class. De Montmollin contrasts the effect 
that these concepts may have on the timing of events with that predicted 
within abstract 'mana~erialist' models that have often been used in 
analysis of Mesoamerican and other complex societies. 
The probl e m of identif ying processes appropriate to the time 
frame in qu estio n is addressed by McGlade in the context of c omouter 
modelling. This seems to off e r the possibility of 'condensing' time in 
order to exolore assumptions about the intervals within which part icular 
oroces ses may be defined. As Bailey notes, behaviour at any point in 
t ime represents the inter sec ti on of orocesses that are both defined and 
operable over varying time spans. ~cGlade' s me thod seems to offer the 
oossibilitv of incoroorating the effects of i nteracting processes . 
The paper s collected here aoorollch the s ub jec t of time from many 
different oersoectives. Thi s i s ent ire ly llDPropriate, fo r many 
diff er ent time frameworks have been considered. 
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BREAKING THE TIME BARRIER 
Geoff Bailey 
Temooral Awareness and Temooral Horizons 
Awareness of time is one of the fundamental characteristics of the 
hwnan brain . According to Davis (1981), a caoacity for 'separated 
learning' -- the ability to relate events which are remote in time and 
space, and to draw consciously on past experience in order to make 
predictions about the future -- is uniquely human, more so than the 
~apacity for symbolic thought, language or art, all of which can be 
found in at least rudimentary form in other species. Many animals 
anticipate the future to a small extent, and some have long memories, 
but none are capable of relating events separated by a time interval of 
more than about one minute. The temporal envelope, past and future, 
within which they live is extremely limited, even for our closest living 
relatives, the chimpanzees (Davis 1981, 131). In contrast, our own 
tem1>oral horizon is capable of extending almost indefinitely into past 
and future. 
How far back in our evolution as a species such abilities were 
present is uncertain, A fullv modern capacity for temporal awareness 
can reasonably be associated with the appearance of anatomically modern 
humans, at least 100,000 years ago. Gowlett (1984) has argued for 
mental abilities associated with the earliest tool-making 2 million 
vears ago which imoly a temooral horizon -- limited perhaps by our 
standards but ~reater by some order of magnitude than that disolayed by 
anv other living species. It follows that time conceots should play an 
important role in archaeological interpretation, in two ways: firstly 
because oeoPle have clearly had varyin~ concepts of time in the past 
which have influenced their thoughts and activiti es and hence the nature 
of the material record left for archaeologists to explore and interpret; 
secondly because varying time concepts i nfluence our own thinking as 
archaeolo~ists, often unconsciously, and thus insidiously permeate dis-
cussions of archaeological theory and methodology. It is this latt e r 
issue which I wish to examine further here. 
Archaeologists have devoted little attention to the ways in which 
time concepts affect their interpretations. Undoubtedly one obstacle is 
the purely technical one of imperfect dating methods, and the 
preoccupation with matters of chronology. A recent survey of central 
government funds in the UK devoted to archaeological research over the 
period 1979-1984 shows a total expenditure of £7.7 million (excluding 
rescue archaeology), of which fully one third was devoted to improved 
dating techniques (Hart Report 1985). Much more work remains to be 
done, and even simple chronological relationships are often matters of 
controversy, so that conceptual issues are easily pushed into the 
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background. ttowever technical developments can not be divorced from 
conceptual ones . Even such a seemingly simple notion as 'contem-
ooraneity' can be defined in many different ways according to a varie ty 
of preconceptions, so that resolution of the degree of contemporaneity 
between two archaeological events is as much a conceptual problem as a 
technical one (Papaconstantinou 1986). 
I have covered some of the ground in more detai I in two previous 
papers (Bailey 1981; 1983). Here I wish to clarify the general argument 
by emohasising the contrast between substantive uniformitarianism and 
time oerspectivism as alternative ways of viewing past behaviour . 
These are related to two quite distinct concepts of past time: e!;'.ohis-
torical (or eitocentric) in which the past is always viewed 
retrospectively from a single, fixed point of view in time, i.e. the 
oresent; and allocentric, in which the past is viewed prospectively 
from earlier to later develooments, from different points of view in 
time and at different time scales. My own preference, as will become 
clear, is for a time oersoectivist and allocentric position. I should 
oreface my remarks by making explicit my own archaeological perspective 
and temooral horizons, which are those of someone who works primarily 
with the archaeological record of about 100,000 to 10,000 years ago 
(with occasional forays into later and earlier periods), and with the 
study of prehistoric economy. 
Substantive Uniformitarianism and Time Perspectivism 
By substantive uniformitarianism I mean the belief that processes 
operated in the oast which are similar to those visible at the present 
day, in other words that there are universal principles. Stated thus, 
I do not dispute the ooint. However substantive uniformitarianism often 
embodies an additional and usually implicit notion that the only proces-
ses that ooerated in the oast are those visible at present. From this 
follows the aritument that in studying prehistoric behaviour we should 
expect the same sort of patterns to be manifest as at present, and thus 
ask the sam e sor ts of questions of our archaeological data, apply the 
same sorts of conceots, and invoke the same sorts of e xp lanator y 
princioles as we do when studying oresent-day behaviour. This pre-
suoooses that we know the oresent, with which we are in direct contact, 
better than we can know the past. Hence the order of orogression in the 
growth of knowledge is from the better known present to the less well 
known oa s tl. 
This is such a common mode of thinking i n archaeological 
interoretation that it seems almost superfluous to enumera t e examples. 
The source of inspiration for many currently popular approaches to 
archaeological interpretation is readily apoarent in the Ii terature of 
human ecology, human geography or sociology. These are all disciplines 
concerned, by definitio n , with relatively short time spans, and 
primarily with the study of small-scale processes. 
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Substantive uniformitarianism has a methodological corollary; for 
whereas we can observe and interrol;'.ate living oeoPle, we can do so only 
indirectly for the past. The primary data of the archaeologist are at 
least one step further removed from the phenomena of interest than are 
the primary data of the contemporary observer. Thus, so the argument 
runs, the archaeologist has to engage in an elaborate exercise of trans-
lating, decoding, transforming, or otherwise cleaning up the material 
record. Inferences from archaeological data seem unavoidably difficult 
and unreliable, and give rise to a special methodological literature and 
terminology involving such concepts as 'ethnographic analogy', 'format-
ion processes', 'middle-range theory', 'taphonomy' and 'contextual 
analysis•2. 
Substantive uniformitarianism thus presupposes that the study of 
past behaviour is substantively similar to the study of present 
behaviour, but methodologically different and essentially less reliable. 
By time persoectivism I mean the belief that different time scales 
bring into focus different sorts of processes, requiring different 
conceots and different sorts of explanatory variables. Behaviour at any 
ooint in time reoresents the inter s ection of orocesses defined bv 
varying time-soans of operation, ranging from ohylogenetic orocesses at 
macro-scales of millions of years at one extreme, to neuropsychological 
one~ at micro-~cales of millise.conds at the other, with a whole range of 
social, economic and demographic processes at intermediate time scales. 
Which of these wi 11 be in focus wi 11 depend on the time perspective of 
the observer and the time depth of observation. Since it is ·impossible 
to bring into simultaneous focus the entire array of processes at one 
scale of observation, it is necessary to define the time spans over 
which particular variables have an observable effect, before considering 
how they interact. On a time span of days to decades, for example, 
what we see of behaviour is dominated by individual action and the 
social interactions between individuals. On a time span of decades to 
hun~reds of ~ears, interactions between individuals and the larger 
social groupings of which they are members, and political interactions 
between such groupings, come more into focus. On a time span of 
hundre~s to thousands of years the inertial lag of demographic and 
economic trends are more clearly discernible, while the effect of indi-
viduals and small -scale soc ial int eractions fades out of view. Small-
sc~le e~vironmental trends also begin to emerge as relevant variables at 
this t1mescale, for example, small c hang es of temperature or 
Precipitation on a re~ional or continental sca le . On a tim e span of 
te~s o! thousand~ to hundreds of thousands of years, the major global 
cl1mat1c and environmental changes of the glacial cycle dominate the 
field of view, and on a soan of hundreds of thousands to millions of 
vears phylogenetic changes involving the extinction of soecies and the 
evol ution of new ones. 
Time oerspectivism is best exemolif ied in the earth scie nces 
which deal with the longest oossible span and the widest spectrum of 
scales , ranging f rom hundreds of millions of years for large-scale 
changes in the configuration of continents and oceans under the impetus 
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of plate movements, to changes in stream behaviour and sedimentation 
patterns on a scale of years to decades. 
It should be emphasised that time perspectivism does not assert 
that small-scale Pro~esses visible in the contemporary world did not 
, ooerate in the remoter past, or that they did not affect the 1 ives of 
! oreliistoric oeoole. Nor does it of itself imply any value judgements 
about the superiority of oarticular scales of observation . What it does 
assert is that the small-scale orocesses that dominate our lives and 
surroundings as living individuals cannot be assumed to be the only 
processes ooerating . They are not necessarily the most appropriate 
variables to study when we view behaviour on a larger scale and over 
longer time spans, nor the most easily accessible. Similar reservations 
apply to the transfer of large-scale concepts to the explanation of 
small-scale phenomena, since the variables involved may change so 
slowly, or have so little effect over shorter time spans, that they can 
be treated as virtually constant at a small scale of observation. 
Time perspectivism thus presupposes almost the exact reverse of 
substantive uniformitarianism. In this view the past, or rather what we 
can effectively investigate of past behaviour, is substantively differ-
ent from the present, especially as we go further back in time and hence 
to longer scales of observation . Its study, however, is 
methodologically similar, involving methods of inference which are 
neither more nor less difficult than those used in the study of contem-
porar:v behaviour . The growth of knowledge, far from proceeding back-
wards in time from the oresent to the oast, oroceeds from the larger 
scale to the smaller scale, and hence from the past to the present, each 
scale of observation providing a perspective or framework within which 
to evaluate smaller-scale phenomena visible at the next scale down in a 
hierarchv of successivelv smaller-scale perspectives. The present is 
interoreted in the light of the past , rather than the other way about, 
although in oractice knowledge may grow through multiple interactions 
between many different time perspectives3. 
Difficulties with Substantive Uniformitarianism 
There are, it seem s to me, four principal difficulties with 
substantive uniformitarianism. Firstly, it implies the superiority of 
studies of the present over studies of the archaeological pas t , whil e at 
the same time denying any possibility to the archaeologist of putting 
such an implication to the test . The argument seems to run somet hing 
like this. Si nce general concepts, theories and principles can only be 
derived from the study of contemporary processes (and a rchaeo logi s ts 
themselves patently seem t o believe this because that is where they go 
for their interpretative models), and since the data of archaeology are 
too fragmentary a nd feeble ever to show up any possible weaknesses in 
these general models, it follows that archaeology is doomed to the role 
of a subservi ent discioline, destined to consume the general insights of 
other s , but never able to eenerate any of its own. In short, the 
archaeolo!?ical stud y of t he past cannot tell us anyt hing of importance 
that we did not already know. It is therefore a pointless intellectual 
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discioline, except perhaps in so far as it clothes in a narrative 
framework of par t i c u 1 a r i n s tan c e s the genera 1 i sat i ons o f o the I' 
disciplines. 
It would not be surprising to find this attitude to the past 
expressed by human ecologists, geographers and sociologists, if only out 
of professional self-interest. Sometimes it is so expressed, as in Sir 
Edmund ~each 's well-known comments as observer at archaeological confe-
rences. On the other hand it should be noted that it was another social 
anthroPolor;ist, Evans-Pritchard (1961), who provided what is still one 
of the most oowerful and coherent statements of the role of time-depth 
in anthrooological generalisation. It is rather unexpected to find 
archaeologists themselves willing to cut the intellectual r;round from 
under their feet in this way. Some, like Trigger (1978), actually make 
a virtue of this, claiming that archaeology should concern itself with 
the particular rather than the general, and confine interpretation to 
the exolanation of specific cases in the past with generalisations drawn 
from disciplines which study the oresent . 
A second difficulty with substantive uniformitarianism is that it 
does, as its very label suggests, require a belief in substantive 
uniformities of behaviour which have persisted, unchanged, through long 
periods of time . This seems an especially paradoxical principle for 
archaeologists to adopt, for it is taken as axiomatic by most that the 
very essence of human behaviour is its variability. Many archaeologists 
would accept that one of the goals of the discipline is the study of 
change or variability (though some would define the goals in terms of 
the search for continuities and uniformities). Yet here we are being 
required to assume uniformity, at least in some aspects of behaviour, 
and furthermore to seek those uniformities in the short time-spans of 
the recent record , instead of in the long-term record where one would 
logically expect such an investigation to begin. 
This leads on to a further difficulty. Let us grant that there are 
some substantive uniformities of behaviour and that thes e are to be 
sought in the contemoorarv record. How ar e we to decide which relation-
shios ar e enduring and which e phemeral? Does the oresence of 
transhumance in the historical period in the Mediterranean, for example, 
ooint to uniform ities of seasonal land- use patterns which can be extra-
oolated through the oast 30,000 years (e.g . Hir;gs et al. 1967) or is 
it a response to oarticular social and historical-;;i-;;umstance; which 
lasted only for a few centuries (e.g. Lewthwaite 1981)? We do not know 
the answer, or at any rate we c a nnot assume s uch a uniformity, unless 
either we have some means of obtaining independent knowledge on this 
point from the ar chaeological record, in which case the whole basi s for 
substantive uniformitarianism ce as es to exist, or we assume the very 
matter that requires investigation. We face a similar problem with a 
whole range of ethnographically or historically obs e rved behavioural 
practices, from dietary patterns to bodily decorati on. It must be 
admitted that some archaeologists, while not exactly claiming circular 
reasoning as a virtue, certainly see it as no vice, on the grounds that, 
since all observations are theory-dependent, all reasoning from 
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observations is circular, and one might as well say what one likes. 
This argument I believe to be entirely specious, based on an over-
simplification of the theoretical component in empirical observation4. 
Taken to its logical conclusion such an argument would compel us to 
abandon not only study of the archaeological past but any sort of 
empirical observation . Such an argument is undoubtedly appealing to 
those who are trying to extract from the archaeological record informat-
ion that it cannot yield, since it spares them the need to make their 
own attempt at empirical investigation, while preserving their claim to 
dismiss everyone else's. 
The final difficulty with substantive uniformitarianism is that it 
presupposes that we know where the boundary lies between 'the present' 
and 'the past', as if these were two unequivocal and established 
categories, and not open to doubt or differences of opinion. Where 
exactly do we draw the 1 ine between observations of the 'present' and 
observations of the 'past'? We could say that the present is anything 
that we observe directly with our own eyes. However, if we wish to know 
about our contemporary world, direct observation in this sense would 
leave most of us with an impossibly limited view. The reality is that a 
great deal of what we claim to know about the contemporary world around 
us deoends on 'second-hand' observation through books, newspapers, tele-
vision and the observations of others. Most of these observations are 
of course not tel 1 ine; us what haooened in the immediate here and now, 
but what hapoened a few minutes, hours , months or years ago. Already 
the duration of time imolied by the concept of the present has started 
to become blurred. If we allow that we can define as contemporary those 
phenomena which fall within the scope of some written records, such as 
newsoapers, why not those phenomena which fal 1 within the scope of al 1 
written records? Who is to say that ancient texts are any less reliable 
as guides to the world they record than our own newspapers, or any less 
amenable to cross-checking from other sources? If ancient written 
records are acceptable as a source of information, why not archaeo-
logical data themse 1 ves, wh i eh are after a 11 a sort of record, 
accessibl e to direct observation and equally susceptible to its own 
methods of interrogat i on and cross-checking? 
Perhaps we should define the present differently, say in terms of 
living s yst e ms. In the cas e of cells we might the n be talking about a 
time- span ranging from hours to years, at the level of the individual 
organi sm vears to de cade s , at the level of social and e cological comm-
unities much longer time- s pan s . It s eems that this definition is no 
more he loful in defining an absolute boundary. Perhaps, then, we should 
de fine as cont emoorarv what is coterminous with our own individual life -
soan. But this will not do eithe r. For we know that there are many 
oeo~le alive at this moment who were born before us, or who will die 
after us . The reality is that concepts like oast and ores ent are, like 
other conceots, theoretica l constructs, and the boundary between them is 
essentially an arbitrary break on a continuum. Where we draw that 
boundary will deoend on the time- s pan over which our preferred 
techniques of observation extend, and the ti me depth of the processes we 
happen to be interested in. · 
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The application of substantive uniformitarianism in archaeology 
rather resembles the case of the geophysicist who wishes to use a sate-
llite telescope in order to demonstrate that from the point of view of a 
person standing on the ground the earth's surface appears flat; or the 
biologist who, wishing to analyse the molecular structure of mammal 
tissue, oursues that interest by driving around a safari park with the 
steering wheel of a landrover in one hand, a pair of binoculars in the 
othe:, and~ no~ebook _bet_ween the knees. One can imagine our hypo-
thetical sc1ent1sts th1nk1ng that they were engaged in an enterprise of 
supreme methodological difficulty involving great feats of technical 
ingenuity, just as one can ima.gine the reaction of most outsiders who 
would dismiss the results as being so trivial or so unreliab{e as 
scarcely to be worth contesting. These examples are obviously absurd, 
because they quite deliberately invoke a mismatch between the scale of 
the phenomena under study and the scale of observation. In fact a tele-
scope above the earth's atmosphere could give some new and very 
interesting information about the outer reaches of the universe, while 
the landrover and the binoculars are indispensable aids for those who 
study the behaviour of mammals as members of ecological communities . 
Yet it is precisely this mismatch, between scale of observation and 
scale of phenomena studied, which follows from the extrapolation of 
concepts and theories derived from the short-term record of the recent 
past onto the longer time spans of the archaeological record and which 
inevitably leads archaeologists into statements of the' obvious or 
attempts at the imoossible. 
Difficulties with Egohistorical Conceots of Time 
Like substantive uniformitarianism , an egocentric view of the past 
sustains the oresumption that the past is in some sense inferior to or 
subordinate to the oresent, without oroviding any grounds for question-
ing or evaluating this assertion. An egocentric concept of time assumes 
that our oresent world is the most imoortant one, which orovides us with 
our frame of reference and our values for interpreting all other worlds. 
In one sense this point of view is inevitable and important, s ince we 
can never fully escape the influence of our present circumstances. It 
is after all our lives, our problems , our survival that are in question. 
However, an egohistorical view of the pas t imposes certain distortions 
of perspective which may not be apoarent , if it is thou ght to be the 
only reference point from which to view human behaviour. For e xample 
it can easily give to the past the appearance of a cumulative 
directional process, leading up to the present, with phe nomena becomin~ 
more advanced, more developed, more complex, more progressive, as one 
moves forward in time, and so more interesting and more relevant to our 
present-day concerns, indeed more like ourselves, which we are inclined 
to regard as t~e most complex and important phenomena of all. This may 
no~ be wholly illusory but clearly st ems from, and obvious ly greatly 
reinforces, the tendency to study in greater depth and know more about 
what happens close to us in time and spac e and thus to see more of its 
de~ail and complexity. Conversely , as.one moves backwards in time , so 
things apoear to become more simole, more primitive more backward more 
regressive, until they di saopear from view altogether, thereby defining 
i' 
I j 
' i:. 
12 
a temporal boundary or discontinuity, beyond which lies nothing ~f 
interest or at any rate nothing that is accessible to study. This 
egocentrlc view of the past is clearly expressed in the idea of 
progress, which has been prevalent s~nce the l_Bth century, was 
vigorously oromoted in 19th century notions of social evolution, and 
remains the dominant philosophical bias of 20th century thought, though 
in much modified form (Gellner 1972). 
This creation of boundaries or discontinuities also serves to 
seoarate us from our past and make our world seem different, perhaps 
uniquely so, from all previous worlds. Once these discon~inu~ties are 
acceoted radical transformations of behaviour -- 'revolutions -- have 
to be in~oked to overcome them. Many, for example, see a discontinuity 
at the be~inning of the industrial era -- the 'Industrial Revolution' --
which so altered the circumstances of human life that the study of what 
came after requires entirely new and different concepts and principles 
from the study of what came before. Others see the origins of lan~ua~e 
and symbolism as the radical discontinuity (the •Uppe r Palaeol1th1c 
Revolution'), which sets aoart the discussion of human beha~iour f_rom 
non-human. For many archaeologists the agricultural revolution defines 
a critical threshold. This is especially common among those who work on 
the later prehistory of Europe, commonly taken to mean prehistory from 
the Neolithic period onwards. For them the Neolithic Revolution pro-
vides a convenient demarcation and justification of their field of 
interests, spatially as well as temporally (since agriculture is 
co!IBl1only held to have originated outside Europe as well as before the 
Neolithic). 
Tti-ese discontinuities can result from purely practical 
considerations, since they often arise from and help to maintain 
convenient demarcations of a field of enquiry, defining the scope of its 
interests and the temporal range of its techniques of observation. In 
this case the discontinuities are by definition oeripheral to inves-
tigation, and their precise nature and causes are regarded as problems 
for others to studv. Conversely, for archaeologists interested in 
culture process, the discontinuities may become the central focus of 
inter es t, thereby achieving an exaggerated importance . In either case 
tlie discontinuities in the past , and the revolutions required to over-
come them, come to be taken for i:?ranted as ' facts' of history . Clearly 
such an e~ocentric view of the past can and does serve the purpose of 
oroviding a barrier between our present human condition and ou! non-
human past, by interposing a series of critical thresholds 1n the 
transformation of human behaviour which have carried us progressively 
f urther from our material and biological origins, and thus helps to 
reinforce our wholly egocentric notion of our own uniqueness and 
suoerioritv. Yet it is questionable whether the existence of 
revolution~ry transformations , representing points of origin in time for 
various phenomena to which we attach importance in the present era, is 
anything other than an illusion, reflecting an arbitrary discontinuity 
imposed by a limited temporal horizon, in much the same way that the 
convergence of parallel lines to a vanishing point on our visual horizon 
is no more than a t rick of visual per spec tive. 
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The alliance of egocentric attitudes to the oast with substantive 
uniformitarianism leads to yet a further paradox. For if our era is 
unique, and separated from previous eras by radical discontinuities, and 
if it is influenced by quite different principles of behaviour and 
action, how can anything we know about our own era serve as the basis 
for extrapolation to previous ones? 
Why, then, do archaeologists cling to substantive uniformitarianism 
in spite of its apparent logical defici encies, its paradoxes, and its 
absurdities? Have I left something out of my account of 
uniformitarianism? Or are the objections to time perspectivism even 
more insuperable? 
Methodological Uniformitarianism 
In fact, have left out one important element in the 
uniformitarian position. As geologists, who first launched the concept, 
have come to realise, uniformitarianism is an ambiguous orinciple 
Involving two quite distinct concepts (Gould 1965) . Substantive 
uniformi tarianism, as I have described it above, has in fact been 
discarded in geologv, where it has become obvious that many processes 
operated in the past which are not visible in the present, either 
because they have ceased to operate, or because they operate so slowly 
or in such a comolex fashion that their effects are onlv clearly visible 
after long oeriods, as, for example , in the movement of tectonic plates 
and the uplift of mountain ranges. 
Methodological uniformitarianism is something quite different. 
This entails a belief that certain uniformities are sufficiently con-
stant to be extrapolated back in time as references against which to 
measure variation in something else. In the natural sciences these 
uniformities are physical and chemical constants. Since these form the 
basis for scientific observation of many phenomena, whether past or 
oresent, methodological uniformitarianism turns out to be no more than a 
statement of scientific method by another name. We are familiar with 
many of these constants in science-based archaeology, for example in the 
use of the half-lif e of radioactive i sotopes as a method of dating. 
There are also biological constants, used , for example, in palaeo-
climatic studies, where the varying propor tions of different plant and 
animal species within a s trati gr aphic column are used to investigate 
climatic variation. Th e methodological un iformity involved is the 
assumption that the habitat preferences of species observed under 
present-day conditions have remained constant through time . Since 
organic ohenomena are more variable than inorganic ones, the 'cons tant' 
may sometimes turn out to be liable to some variation, and th e 
assumption ooen to ques tion. 
There are manv cases of the us e of such me thodological uniformities 
in a rchaeology, for examole: the soan of the human arm as a measure of 
variation in the discard of artefacts around fireplaces ; the fixed 
structure of animal skeletons as a measure of variation in the human 
butchery of animal ca rcases; a two - hour walk as a defining limit of 
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daily activity from a ~iven point in the landscape, used as a measure of 
variation in princioles of si te location; the nutritional needs of the 
human individual, used as a measure of variation in subsistence economy. 
These uniformities and many others like them are, of course, statements 
of biolog-ical or ohysiolog-ical function. As such, their application to 
archaeoloqical interpretation is often considered a statement of the 
obvious, or a 'dehumanisin'4' of the studv of the past. This criticism 
misses the ooint . It is precisely because the uniformities are state-
ments of the obvious that they can be extrapolated to other temporal 
contexts with some confidence. And they are only dehumanising to the 
extent that they become transformed from means-to-an-end to ends-in-
themselves. There is no reason why biological uniformities of this type 
have to be confined to the study of biological phenomena. It has to be 
said that many practitioners of a functional approach are as confused 
about this distinction -- between means and end, methods and objectives, 
methodological and substantive uniformities -- as are their critics. 
At this point an interesting question occurs about the study of 
human behaviour. Are there social and psychological uniformities with 
the same methodological status as the physical, chemical and biological 
ones discussed above? Here we are in something of a dilemma, because we 
know (or think we know) that these features of human behaviour are 
variable. Yet there· is one such widely proposed uniformity, and that is 
the structural i ste ( in the French sense) assert ion of uni for mi ty in the 
wav the human brain classifies the environment into binary opposites. 
It is interesting to note in passing t hat, like the functional 
uniformities cited earlier, this structuraliste uniformity is often 
criticised as a statement of the obvious . However, when this supoosed 
uniformity is aoPlied to the archaeological record, it is not entirely 
clear whether it is being used as a methodological uniformity, in which 
case one has to ask what othe!:_ phen9.mena it brings within the scope of 
emoirical enquirv, or whether it is being prooosed as a substantive 
uniformitv, in which case one is forced to ask what other methods are 
available to orovide an independent evaluation of it5.~~- -~~~ 
In short I regard methodological uniformities as an acceptable --
indeed indispensabl e -- means to observation of the archaeological past. 
But acceptance of the method does not require belief in the substan tive 
version of uniformitarianism. 
Difficulties with Time Perspectivism 
What, then, of the barriers to an acceptance of time per spectivism? 
Here , too, there a re four main difficulties. First of all there is the 
sub-disciplinary speci a lisat ion and compartmentalisation within archaeo-
logy, which tends to obscure the need to think about the effect of 
different time scales. Palaeolithic ar chaeologists, for example, are 
not well known for being f am iliar with what is involved in a s tudy of 
cost-med i eval archaeo logy, except at a superf icial or a purely technical 
level, and vice versa. If they were, the problems of r ela ting concepts 
to aoorooriate time scales would be more apparent, and the need to 
invest i ga t e their interactions felt more acutely. To some extent these 
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internal barriers within the discipline are beginning to break down with 
the growth of interest in archaeological theory and the aspiration of 
universal applicability. However, much of what passes for substantive 
theory in archaeology simply represents a projection to t he universal of 
factors which in reality have a much more restricted scope of 
application derived from a limited time perspective. 
A second difficulty is that we intuitively resist the notion of 
moving our oerspective in time, partly for egocentric reasons, but also 
because we know that it is physically imoossible to travel through time. 
The notion that we can at least in imagination change our time oersoec -
tive is a difficult one, even though it involves no great er effort of 
imagination in orinciole than that required to view ourselves as indivi-
duals from someone else's point of view, or to view a point in space 
from a different soatial oerspective. 
A third difficulty with time oerspectivism is that, in seeking a 
certain detachment from the oresent, it can be accused of claiming a 
sort of objectivity of knowledge through study of the oast that is 
denied to studies of the oresent. However, this search for detachment 
should not be mistaken for an assumption of objectivity in the sense of 
superior or absolute knowledge. We can never fully escape the influence 
of our own historical era. If allocentric concepts of' the past seem 
like an attempt to achieve a Martian's eye view of human history, we 
should remember that even Martians would presumably interpret our world 
in the light of subjective notions derived from experience of their own 
world. The argument calls for diversity of persoectives rather than for 
the superiority of one over others -- for challenging the priority and 
uniqueness of the present ei-a and the superiority of the present time 
oerspective, rather than asserting it without question. 
A final problem with time oerspectivism is that it is often 
oerceived as imolyin~ some degree of determinism or reductionism, and a 
denial of human creativity and individuality. If there are larger-scale 
orocesses which ooerate t o some extent i ndependently of the small-scale 
activities of our dailv lives, must we not then suopose that we are in 
the grip of oowerful lon~-term forces over which we ·have no control , and 
which can override smaller-scale processes? The objection to time 
oersoectivism here is comolementary to one of the objections to 
substantive uniformi tarianism: whereas it can be objected that the 
latter asserts the oriority of the present over the past, and thus seems 
t o deny any creativitv or intellectual role to orehistoric archaeolo-
gists, time per soectivism seems to redress the balance too far in the 
other dir ect ion, c l a iming the priority of long-term processes over 
short-term ones, thus deny ing any creativit y or importance to past (or 
present-day) people. This impression is reinforced by an emphasis, 
especially by those who work on the lon'4er time span s of the earl i er 
archaeological record, on biological and environmental factors. This is 
often accompanied by inattention to social variables, sometimes exp licit 
dismissal of them as short-term 'noise', and by an impi-ession that 
behavioural processes of the longer-term record are essentially asocial. 
I 
I 
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This emphasis on biological and environmental factors is related to 
two points already discussed: firstly, that these are often the most 
reliable source of methodological uniformities with which to observe 
past behaviour; secondly, that they respond to changes in the major 
variables operative over the longer time spans of the Pleistocene 
record, and need therefore to be brought into the picture. However, 
this emphasis can easily be misread as a denial of the social. 
Conversely the objection to much of the 'social archaeology' that is 
imported into earlier archaeological interpretation, as I see it, is 
that the social factors are often not specified except in the vaguest 
terms, to demonstrate allegiance to a belief in human individuality and 
creativity, as if this notion were under threat. Or else the social 
orocesses proposed are small-scale interactions simply extrapolated 
directly from the anthropological and sociological record of the recent 
oast and exhibiting all the worst difficulties of substantive uniformi-
tarianism. The result has been a direct confrontation, often 
entertaining but ultimately fruitless and distracting , between dogmas of 
the social and the ideational on the one side, and of the environmental 
and the biological on the other, which continues to reverber ate in the 
archaeoloi;tical literature6. The important question is not whether 
social factors a r e oresent or absent in the long-term record, but what 
sort of social conceots are aporooriate at this scale, and in what ways 
thev interact , if at all, with the demographic, economic, environmental 
and biological variables that manifestly dominate the field of view at 
larger scales of focus. This matter deserves more serious thought from 
archaeologists than it has thus far received. 
An important tenet of time perspectivism, in any case, is that 
orocesses observable at one scale cannot be reduced to, or deduced from, 
processes at another scale. For example, the large-scale motions of the 
earth's tectonic plates are not the outcome of small-scale stream pro-
cesses of erosion and sedimentation extrapolated over very long time 
spans. Nor are stream processes deducible from, or epiphenomena! to, 
tectonic motion s . The two sets of ohenomena operate on s uch vastly 
different geo~raphical and temporal scales that they seem to be largely 
independent of each other, although they may sometimes interac t in a 
zone of t emporal and geog raphical overlap , for example where rivers 
flowing over a fault zone have their profiles di s torted by repeated 
earthquake movement. Similar questions of interacti on or independence 
arise in discussions of human behaviour, for example in the relationsh ip 
between ind ividual a c tion and social norms , or in t he relationsh ip 
between social behaviour and biological or environmental constraints. 
Reproductive decisions, for examole, are at one level socially deter-
mined, but a t a larger scale other factors must b e taken into 
considerJ1tion to understand demograohic trends . The oroblem, then, i s 
to identify the different sca l es of proce sses, how, if at all, t~ey 
interact, and what that degree of interaction or independence t e lls us 
about mo r e fundamental orincioles. If the non-human sci e nces are any 
l?Uide, interaction seems to occur either between processes with similar 
or overlaooing temporal scales of ooeration, or between vastly 
dis s imilar scales of ohenomena, for examole between the expansion of 
galaxies and the behaviour of sub-atomic particles, between movement s of 
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the earth's crust and the mechanical properties of solid compounds, 
between ohylogenetic evolution and the behaviour of the genome, and 
oerhaps in the human sciences, between the cultural and social 
develooments of the Quaternary oeriod and the workings of the brain. 
Conclusion 
The reasons for oreferrin~ a time oersoectivis t approach can be 
surrmarised as follows. It gives to archaeological study of the past a 
sense of autonomy and ourpose, and avoids t he sense of inadequacy which 
pervades the discipline in it s tendency to defer to the authority of 
other disciplines, to borrow, often superficially, the content s of their 
textbooks, to acquiesce in accusations of methodological inferioritv, 
or to take refuge in techn ical mysteries. Secondly, it offers the 
possibilit y of placing some sort of check on our egohistorical notions 
of our own uniqueness and importance, and of putting these into an 
alternative perspective. Finally, it should be noted that other 
disciplines are beginning to explore time-scaling effects within their 
own limits, for example sociology (Giddens 1981), geography (Holly 
1978), and ecology (O'Neill et al. 1986), though the range of time 
scales that they can encompass-is necessarily rather restricted. 
Archaeology covers a much larger span of time and a much greater range 
of time scales than any other human science, and is best placed to 
explore the interactions between the full range of phenomena that 
impinge on and constitute the various processes that are loosely lumped 
together by such phrases as 'human behaviour' and 'human history'. 
Precisely what phenomena are observed at different time scales and how 
they are to be related is the fundamental problem, and one which only 
archaeolo~ists are in a oosition fully to address. If we face up to 
that challenge, we may ultimately say something useful and novel about 
ourselves as humans which will make a genuine contribution to the growth 
of collective self-knowledge. First, however, we shall have to break 
the time barrier imoosed by our limited temporal horizons, and break 
free from the flat, two-dimensional, single-scaled view of the past 
which has dominated our intellectual tradition until now. 
1. Since some of my orevious statements on this issue have been 
misinterpreted (e.g. Head 198 6) to mean that I actual 1 y advocate 
substantive uniformitariani sm, I should emphasise that my comment s here 
are s tatement s of what f ol lows logically from the substantive uni f ormi-
tarian position, not a s tatement of my per sonal preferences. It should 
also be clear that, in attacking substantive uniformitarian ism, I am not 
attacking the search for unive rsal principles, but the assumption that 
archaeological study of the oast can have nothing to contribute to such 
a search. 
2. Mv ooint here is not that the problems of inference discussed under 
these various label s are irrelevant or unimportant , rather that they are 
not different in principle from the problems of i~ at affect 
all observational disciolines . Archaeologi s·ts are o~.00. ·cw ki,, 
UBRA: '. ·,, 1 1 
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that their discioline suffers from peculiarly difficult methodological 
obstacles. My objection to the labels is that they suggest something 
peculiar and slightly mysterious about archaeological inference. They 
also distract from the discussion of substantive issues and run the risk 
of encouraging an inductive frame of mind in which archaeologists may 
come to believe that, if only they clean up their methodological act 
and refine the data, this will somehow solve all problems of 
interpretation. 
3. The term 'perspectivism' is not entirely satisfactory. In the 
ohilosophical literature, especially in the work of Ortega y Gasset 
(1914), it refers to a relativist thesis in which each individual's 
ooint of view, or perspective, is treated as equally true and unique, so 
that the onlv ultimate reality is the self and the circumstances of the 
individual's life. A similar idea is found in some of the writings of 
Niehsche, and leads on to the Frankfurt School and to social 
ohilosophies embraced with enthusiasm by archaeologists opposed to 
'positivism', 'scientific method', separation of facts from values, and 
the like. This leads in a rather different direction from the sort of 
temporal relativism discussed here. I have referred elsewhere to 
hierarchical causation, but the introduction of this concept implies 
that some revels within a hierarchy are more important than others, and 
I wish to avoid that prejudgement at this stage. In so far as labels 
are necessary I prefer time perspectivism to the alternatives. 
4. There are at least two theoretical components to observation: 
theories which underpin observational methods; and theories which guide 
the choice of problem and provide the source of explanation for what is 
observed. The essential feature of scientific method is that these two 
components should be independent of each other . The method does not 
determine what phenomena are studied, nor does it guarantee certainty 
(for the observational theories may be wrong); even less does it 
guarantee some sort of absolute knowledge. 
5. The que s tion of where Ian Hodder's symbolic and post-processual 
approach to archaeological interpretation would fit into this discussion 
is difficult to decide at present. The approach is evolving so rapidly 
and the formulation s change so often that it is doubtful whether a 
sufficientlv stable conceotual confiE!uration has yet emerged to allow 
assessment. Bv assertin~ that material culture is as much a direct 
exoress ion of behaviour as, say, soeech, social interaction or other 
forms of activity (rather than an imperfect material byproduct of such 
activities), the approach seems to avoid some of the worst 
methodological difficulties of substantive uniformitarianism and to 
bring a great deal of otherwise intractable archaeological data within 
the scope of direct emllirical investigation. On the other hand, the 
assertion that w e can only interpret past behaviour to the extent that 
we assume that past peoples conceptualised their world in much the same 
sort of way that we do ours, is obviously vulnerable to the charge of 
c ircular reasoning, while the emphasis on small-scale social inter-
actions is equally vulnerable to the charge of an extreme substantive 
uniformitarianism. It is certainly significant that almost all those 
19 
students who have oursued such an approach with any success so far have 
confined their attentions to case studies in the ethnographic oresent or 
the recent historical past. 
6. The Polarity creates another misleading boundary, like that between 
•past' and 'present', which proves difficult to define on closer 
inspection. Studies of palaeoeconomy are often placed on the 
environmental side of the boundary, but in fact they cut right across 
it, or should do so, whence lies their interest. 
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CHRONOS AND THE ORACLE: 
S0'\1E THOlDHTS ON TI<\IB, T!MESCALES AND SIMULATION 
James McGlade 
Introduction 
Simulation in archaeology was something of a growth industry in the 
1970s as comouter facilities became more generally available and in 
response to a seminal article by Doran (1970), A wide variety of 
modelling exercises was undertaken, spurred mainly by geograohic exemp -
lars, which resulted in a number of spatial studies documenting, for 
example, artefact dispersal and settlement evolution. The growing 
popularity and predictive potential claimed for simula tion , evident in 
Ian Hodder's (1978) edited volume, arguably reached a high-water mark 
with the ryublication of the School of American Research Advanced Seminar 
on systems models and simulation (Sabloff 1981). 
As a by-oroduct of the quantitative shif t ushered in by the "new 
archaeology'', simulation was seen as oart of a growing corpus of 
methodological advances: mathematical rigour was to be the harbinger of 
a new set of exolanatory models, and an end to inductive, descriptive 
techniques. The inadequacy of these latter 'normat ive' orocedures was 
crystallised in Binford's (1972) exhortations for the adoption of an 
alternative systemic and evolutionary oersoective, and it was orimarily 
thi s emphasis which orovided substantial imoetus for the widesoread 
adootion of simulation modelling in archaeology. 
Not surorisingly, the rigidity and narrow positivist orientation of 
this oaradigm rendered its application to complex social situations 
problematic and stimulated an ongoing debate concerning the inability of 
systems thinking to offer a 'meaningf ul' contribu tio n to the interpre-
tation of s tructure , mean ing and individual action within culture 
proc ess (Godelier 1977; Friedman and Rowlands 1978; Giddens 1979; Tilley 
1981 ; Hodder 1982, 1986). 
Thus, in spi t e of the substantial intellectual effort in ves t ed in 
s imulati on st ud ies, we are faced with the uncomfortable prospect that, 
from a methodologica l and theoretical standpoint, s imulati on has failed: 
at l east in its much heralded ability to render the complex questions of 
culture orocess more t ractable. Thi s i s less a criticism of the genera-
tion of simp ler models d esigned for heuris t ic pu rpo se s , but rather i s 
directed at the larger multicomponent modelling enterorises, su ch as 
those concerned with t he s imulati on of culture change. 
This article su~gests that the failure to 'deliver the goods' is in 
lar ge oart a consequence of inapprooriat e and flawed model! in1t pr o-
cedures employed by archaeologists; more se riously it represents an 
(Archaeological Review f rom Cambridge 6:1 (1987)) 
